Electronics Mart India: strong Q1, but the real story starts now
The stock jumped after a blockbuster quarter. The bigger question is how to track this going forward — starting with the base it was measured against.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Q1 FY27 revenue +39% YoY | ₹2,419 crore |
| Q1 FY27 EBITDA +118% YoY; 9.9% margin | ₹239 crore |
| Q1 FY27 PAT +458% YoY | ₹121 crore |
| Same-store sales growth against a very weak base quarter | 34.2% |
| Gross margin up from 14.6% | 17.2% |
| Pre-Ind AS 116 EBITDA margin the margin that has actually paid the rent | 8.3% |
| Bill cuts against average ticket size +2% — volume-led growth | +36% |
| Store count 220 multi-brand, 7 exclusive brand, 100+ cities | 227 |
| NCR store-level EBITDA margin against a 2.5–3% FY27 target; South was 10.9% | 4.9% |
Electronics Mart India was up around 9% on 10 August. The trigger was not subtle.
Q1 FY27 revenue grew 39% to ₹2,419 crore. EBITDA grew 118% to ₹239 crore. PAT grew 458% to ₹121 crore. Same-store sales growth came in at 34.2%. Gross margin went from 14.6% to 17.2%, and EBITDA margin from 6.3% to 9.9%.
So a combination of strong revenue growth, operating leverage and margin expansion triggered the move.
There is one number in that release I liked more than any of those. Bill cuts — the number of transactions invoiced — grew 36%. Average ticket size grew 2%.
That distinction matters more than it looks. If sales were rising mainly because prices had gone up, average ticket size would be doing the work. It is not. The number of transactions rose 36%. That is volume-led growth.
So the quarter was real. But before anyone annualises it, there is a piece of context that changes how you read every percentage in that release.
The base was a hole
In H1 FY26, same-store sales growth was reported at minus 4.8%. In Q2 FY26 alone it was plus 11.4%.
For a half year to average minus 4.8% when the second quarter was plus 11.4%, the first quarter has to have been very sharply negative. That is arithmetic, not opinion.
And management described that period themselves. On the Q3 FY26 call in February, Karan Bajaj said April was really bad, that there was practically no sale in May and June in quarter one last year, and that air coolers and refrigerators were next to zero.
So Q1 FY27 was genuinely very good. It was also measured against a crater.
What does Electronics Mart actually do?
The business is simple enough to explain in one paragraph.
You walk into an Electronics Mart store looking for an AC, a fridge, a washing machine, a television or a phone. Instead of one brand, you get Samsung, LG, Sony, Daikin, Blue Star, Vivo, Oppo, OnePlus and others under the same roof. You look at four options, a salesman explains the difference, you buy one, often on an EMI arranged in the store.
That is it. At the end of Q1 FY27 the company ran 227 stores — 220 multi-brand outlets and 7 exclusive brand outlets — across more than 100 cities.
It makes money on the spread between what it pays the OEM and what it charges you. In FY26 that spread was 14.4%. Out of it come salaries, rent, marketing, warehousing and logistics. FY26 revenue was ₹7,183 crore and PAT was ₹107 crore. Roughly one and a half rupees kept on every hundred of sales.
The Q1 FY27 mix was 48% large appliances, 39% mobiles, and 13% small appliances, IT and others. That mix matters because the legs are not equally profitable. Mobiles are high turnover and low margin. Large appliances, especially cooling products, carry better margins — which is one reason profitability can swing hard from quarter to quarter on nothing more than the weather.
The one accounting point you need
I am going to use the words "pre Ind AS" a few times, so here is what they mean in plain language.
192 of the 227 stores are leased. Under Ind AS 116, a lease is accounted for as though you bought the shop with a loan. The rent disappears from operating costs, an asset appears on the balance sheet, a lease liability appears next to it, and the rent reappears lower down the P&L as depreciation plus interest.
Ignore the complicated terms and think of it like this: you have leased a property, but Ind AS 116 lets it be shown as depreciation plus interest charges, which sit below EBITDA — thereby boosting EBITDA, because it no longer carries the rental.
So what we really care about is adjusted, pre-Ind AS EBITDA, which does deduct the lease rentals.
| Q1 FY27, ₹ crore | Reported | Ind AS 116 impact | Pre Ind AS 116 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total revenue | 2,419.0 | — | 2,419.0 |
| Gross profit | 417.2 | — | 417.2 |
| Gross margin | 17.2% | — | 17.2% |
| Rent expense | 0.0 | 39.3 | 39.3 |
| EBITDA | 238.9 | — | 199.7 |
| EBITDA margin | 9.9% | — | 8.3% |
| Depreciation | 41.6 | 26.4 | 15.2 |
| Finance cost | 37.2 | 25.1 | 12.2 |
| PBT before exceptional items | 162.1 | — | 174.3 |
So when the company reports a Q1 FY27 EBITDA margin of 9.9%, the margin that has actually paid the rent is about 8.3%. Electronics Mart deserves credit here, because it voluntarily discloses both numbers when it does not have to.
The cluster model
Electronics Mart does not scatter stores across India. It enters a geography, builds density, puts a warehouse and a delivery and service network around it, and spends on local marketing. Hyderabad first, then the rest of Telangana, then Andhra Pradesh, then NCR from 2022. West Bengal is next.
That single approach explains a lot. It explains why consolidated margins look as respectable as they do. It explains why the company keeps expanding, since the prize if the model travels is enormous. And it is the concentration risk sitting underneath everything else.
The uncomfortable part: it grew, and profits did not follow
| ₹ crore | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 4,349.3 | 5,445.7 | 6,285.4 | 6,731.3 | 7,183.3 |
| Gross profit | 593.9 | 740.7 | 914.7 | 997.5 | 1,037.1 |
| Gross margin | 13.7% | 13.6% | 14.6% | 14.8% | 14.4% |
| EBITDA | 291.9 | 336.1 | 449.5 | 451.1 | 438.2 |
| EBITDA margin | 6.7% | 6.2% | 7.2% | 6.7% | 6.1% |
| Depreciation | 71.3 | 85.4 | 105.7 | 126.7 | 156.2 |
| Finance cost | 84.6 | 98.5 | 107.7 | 117.5 | 153.7 |
| Profit after tax | 103.9 | 122.8 | 183.9 | 160.5 | 107.1 |
| PAT margin | 2.4% | 2.3% | 2.9% | 2.4% | 1.40% |
Revenue up about 65%. Store count more than doubled. PAT in FY26 almost exactly where it was in FY22, having peaked at ₹184 crore in FY24. RoCE cut from 18.9% to 11.5%.
The mechanism is the two lines you can see above. Between FY22 and FY26, depreciation went from ₹71 crore to ₹156 crore and finance cost went from ₹85 crore to ₹154 crore. Together they rose by about ₹154 crore, while EBITDA over the same four years rose by about ₹146 crore.
The bull case, in one setup
At Q1 FY27, 96 stores were classified as mature and 131 were under four years old, with an average age of just 1.9 years.
Think about what a new store looks like. From day one it carries employees, rent, electricity and marketing. Say it does ₹20 crore of sales in year one. Over the next few years footfall builds, repeat customers accumulate, local brand recognition grows, and the same store does ₹30 crore or ₹40 crore.
| Q1 FY27 | Mature stores (>4 years) | Non-mature (<4 years) |
|---|---|---|
| Number of stores | 96 | 131 |
| Retail revenue | ₹1,628 crore | ₹676 crore |
| Total EBITDA | ₹183 crore | ₹55 crore |
| EBITDA margin | 11.2% | 8.1% |
Costs do not double when sales double. That gap is operating leverage. Which means Electronics Mart does not need to open another hundred stores for profits to rise. It needs the ones it has already paid for to get busier.
The macro is real, but it is not the thesis
The underlying market does have structural support, and it is worth stating briefly.
IBEF expects India's consumer durables industry to grow at around 11% CAGR to roughly ₹3 lakh crore by FY29, and estimates around 30% of the industry is still unorganised. The IEA estimates only about one in five Indian households currently owns an air conditioner, with cooling demand potentially more than doubling by 2035. And in September 2025, GST on ACs and dishwashers came down from 28% to 18%, with larger televisions also moving to 18%.
Put together: penetration is low, consumers are trading up, organised retail is gaining share, and large appliances just got cheaper.
That is a genuinely good backdrop. But every organised retailer in India gets that backdrop. It is not what makes Electronics Mart interesting or dangerous. Execution is.
NCR is the proof point
Their penetration into the South has worked. The question has always been whether it travels.
For FY26, NCR store-level EBITDA margin was around 0.2–0.3%, against 6.5% in the South. Management targeted 2.5% to 3% for FY27 on a pre-Ind AS basis.
Q1 FY27 came in at 4.9%. South was 10.9%. Both are store-level figures that exclude corporate and warehouse costs, which is why they run above the company margin.
For me the 4.9% is the most important number in the entire quarter, more than the 39% or the 458%. It is the first hard evidence in four years that the cluster playbook is not a Telangana-only phenomenon.
And it gets better when you notice the context. NCR's same-store growth was only 14.6%, the weakest of the four clusters, and management explained why: the cooling products market in the North was negative this year. So NCR delivered that margin without the tailwind that made the South look spectacular.
I would not declare victory on one quarter. Q2 and Q3 are when NCR's structural cost disadvantage — higher rent, higher marketing, and competition from Croma, Reliance and Vijay Sales — shows up without a summer to hide behind. But this is now the number I would check first, every quarter.
And the company is spending again
Based on the Q1 call, FY27 store additions are now expected at 25 to 30: roughly 10 to 12 in West Bengal, 8 to 10 in NCR, around 5 in the South. That is higher than the roughly 20 discussed at Q4 FY26. Capex is about ₹100 crore for new stores plus about ₹50 crore for property purchases in Kolkata over two years, all funded internally.
Kolkata is the next test, and worth being clear-eyed about. NCR took four years to reach 4.9%. A new cluster starts with low throughput, front-loaded marketing and a learning curve management itself described at Q4 as a 12 to 14 month cycle before things work on the floor.
So FY27 has two forces pulling against each other. Older stores maturing, which adds margin. And 25 to 30 new stores opening, which subtracts it. Which force wins is the entire question.
What management is actually guiding, and why it is the best signal in the release
Q1 delivered 39% growth, 17.2% gross margin, 9.9% EBITDA margin. FY27 guidance is 18–20% revenue growth, 15–15.5% gross margin, 7.5–8% EBITDA margin.
Now do the arithmetic, because it is stark.
FY26 revenue was ₹7,183 crore. Growth of 18–20% gives ₹8,476 to ₹8,620 crore. Q1 has already banked ₹2,419 crore. So the remaining nine months only need ₹6,057 to ₹6,201 crore against ₹5,444 crore last year. That is 11% to 14% growth for the rest of the year, against 39% in Q1.
Same for margins. The full-year gross margin guide implies roughly 14.1% to 14.8% for the remaining nine months, against 14.4% in the comparable nine months of FY26 — essentially flat. The EBITDA guide implies roughly 6.6% to 7.3%, against 6.0%.
Put it the other way. Hold Q1's 9.9% margin all year on ₹8,500 crore and you would print around ₹840 crore of EBITDA. They are guiding ₹636 to ₹690 crore.
And they were pushed on it three times on the same call. Manoj Gori asked whether 18–20% was too conservative given the strong start. Rupesh Tatiya asked whether 8–9% EBITDA margin was modellable, and was told 8–9% is too optimistic and 7.5–8% is more achievable. Zaki Nasir asked whether ₹10,000 crore of revenue was possible this year, and was told the comfortable guidance stays at 18–20%.
Three analysts tried to talk them up. They declined each time. Managements that talk down their own upside after a blowout quarter are considerably rarer, and considerably more useful, than the ones who do the reverse.
They also told you exactly why Q1 will not repeat. Gross margin was helped by a heavier cooling-product mix, which carries better margins, and by inventory bought before price increases in mobiles and laptops. The second of those is a one-off by definition. You get it once, when prices rise and you happen to be holding cheap stock.
So Q1 has built a very comfortable cushion. The question is how much of it survives.
What I am tracking from here
| What | Why |
|---|---|
| Revenue growth | The full-year guide needs only 11–14% from the remaining nine months. Materially above that means the demand story is stronger than management currently assumes |
| Gross margin | Q1's 17.2% should normalise, and that is fine. What I want is for it to settle around the guided 15–15.5% rather than falling back to older levels |
| EBITDA margin expansion | The big one. If the store-maturity thesis is right, EBITDA should start growing faster than revenue. That is the whole argument |
| PAT conversion | The historical failure point. Depreciation and finance cost ate the entire incremental EBITDA of the last expansion cycle. Watch whether they do it again |
| NCR margin outside the summer | 4.9% in Q1 was ahead of the 2.5–3% target. Q2 and Q3 are the honest test |
What are you paying for it?
Market cap is around ₹6,960 crore at the time of writing. There is no PAT guidance, so what follows is my estimate, not the company's.
Management's revenue and EBITDA guidance implies FY27 EBITDA of roughly ₹636 to ₹690 crore. Assume depreciation rises towards ₹175 to ₹180 crore as stores are added, finance costs land around ₹140 to ₹145 crore given management guided them roughly ₹10 crore below FY26, and tax stays near the historical effective rate of about 26%.
That gives FY27 PAT of roughly ₹240 to ₹275 crore, against ₹107 crore in FY26. At the current market cap that is about 29x on ₹240 crore, 27x on ₹260 crore and 25x on ₹275 crore. Call it 25–29x my estimated FY27 earnings, with roughly 27x as a midpoint. The depreciation assumption is the loosest link in that chain, and it is mine.
So, 27x for a management guidance of 18–20% revenue growth. I know it might seem high. But a lot depends on execution and the pace. If they are genuinely conservative and they hit it out of the park on the numbers I would be tracking, then 27x might seem reasonable given they might hit 30% growth. Else, things might falter.
That is why tracking and keeping up with the story becomes very important.
12 min read